We study the probability distribution of user accusations in the q-ary Tardos fingerprinting system under the Marking Assumption, in the restricted digit model. In particular, we look at the applicability of the so-called Gaussian approximation, which states that accusation probabilities tend to the normal distribution when the fingerprinting code is long. We introduce a novel parametrization of the attack strategy which enables a significant speedup of numerical evaluations. We set up a method, based on power series expansions, to systematically compute the probability of accusing innocent users. The 'small parameter' in the power series is 1/m, where m is the code length. We use our method to semi-analytically study the performance of the Tardos code against majority voting and interleaving attacks. The bias function 'shape' parameter κ strongly influences the distance between the actual probabilities and the asymptotic Gaussian curve. The impact on the collusion-resilience of the code is shown. For some realistic parameter values, the false accusation probability is even lower than the Gaussian approximation predicts. 
X ji
Embedded symbol in segment i for user j p (i) Bias vector for column i F Distribution function of the bias vector, p (i) ∼ F f ( p α ) Marginal distribution of F for one component κ Shape parameter contained in F σ ( 
i) α
Number of occurrences of symbol α in attackers' segment i P Probability distribution for σ P 1 Marginal distribution for one component of σ
Marginal distribution for q − 1 components of σ y i Symbol in segment i of attacked content θ y|σ Prob. that attackers output symbol y, given σ S j Accusation sum of user j S Coalition accusation sum,
List of accused users ε 1 Max. tolerable prob. of fixed innocent user getting accused ε 2 Max. tolerable prob. of not catching any attacker 
Collusion attacks against forensic watermarking
Fingerprinting provides a means for tracing the origin and distribution of digital data. Before distribution of digital content, the content is modified by applying an imperceptible fingerprint, which plays the role of a personalized serial number. The fingerprint is usually embedded through a watermarking algorithm. Once an unauthorized copy of the content is found, the identity can be determined of those users who participated in the creation of the unauthorized copy. This can be done using a tracing algorithm, which outputs a list of allegedly guilty users. This process is also known as 'forensic watermarking'.
Reliable tracing of content requires security against attacks that aim to remove the embedded information from a copy. Collusion attacks, where a group of pirates collude to compare their copies, are a particular threat. As any differences between the copies have to arise from the watermarks and not the content, such a comparison gives information which can be used to remove the watermark. To counter this threat, coding theory has produced a number of collusion-resistant codes. In any practical implementation, they must be combined with some kind of embedding scheme. The resulting system has two layers [9, 19] : The coding layer determines which message to embed and protects against collusion attacks. The underlying watermarking layer hides symbols of the message in segments of the content. The symbols are either binary or from a larger alphabet. The interface between the fingerprinting code and the watermarking system is usually specified in terms of the marking assumption plus additional assumptions that are referred to as a 'model'. The marking assumption states that the colluders are able to perform modifications only in those content segments where the colluders received differently marked content. These segments are called detectable positions. The 'model' specifies the kind of symbol manipulations that the attackers are able to perform in detectable positions. The commonly used restricted digit model only allows them to choose pieces from their copies of the content, i.e. each segment of the unauthorized copy carries exactly one symbol that the attackers have available. The unreadable digit model allows for slightly stronger attacks. The attackers are also able to erase the fingerprint at detectable positions. Under the arbitrary digit model the attackers can put arbitrary symbols in detectable positions, while the general digit model additionally allows erasures at detectable positions.
Tardos codes
Many collusion resistant codes have been proposed in the literature. Most notable are the Boneh-Shaw construction [5] and the by now famous Tardos code [23] . The former construction uses a concatenation of an inner code with a random outer code, while the latter one is a fully randomized binary code. We briefly summarize some of the most important developments regarding Tardos codes. The number of users is n. In Tardos' original paper [23] a binary code was given achieving length m = 100c 2 0 ln
, along with a proof that m ∝ c 2 0 is asymptotically optimal 1 for large coalitions, for all alphabet sizes. Here c 0 denotes the number of colluders that can be resisted, and ε 1 is the maximum allowed probability of accusing a fixed 2 innocent user.
The original Tardos code construction contained two unfortunate design choices which caused the proportionality constant '100' to be so high. First, the false negative probability ε 2 (not accusing any of the guilty users) was coupled to ε 1 according to ε 2 = ε c 0 /4 1 . This gives ε 2 ε 1 which is highly unusual in the context of content distribution; a deterring effect is achieved already at ε 2 ≈ 1 2 , while the false positive probability (≈nε 1 ) needs to be very small. In the subsequent literature (e.g. [4, 21] ) the ε 2 was decoupled from ε 1 , leading to a substantial improvement of the code length.
Second, the symbols 0 and 1 were not treated on an equal footing. Only segments where the attackers produce a 1 were taken into account. This procedure ignores 50% of all the available information. A fully symbol-symmetric version of the Tardos code was given in [20] , leading to a further improvement of the code length by a factor 4.
A further improvement was achieved in [17] . The Tardos code construction consists of two probabilistic steps. In the first step, a bias parameter is generated for each segment. In Tardos' original construction the probability density function (pdf) for the bias is a continuous function, suitable for arbitrary coalition size. In [17] a class of discrete distributions was given that performs better against finite coalition sizes than the original pdf. 1 The proportionality m ∝ c 2 0 was already known in the context of spread-spectrum watermarking. Kilian et al. [13] showed that, if the watermarks have a component-wise normal distribution, then Ω( √ m/ln n) differently marked copies are required to successfully erase any mark with non-negligible probability. 2 Not to be confused with the total false positive probability (which we denote as η). The relation is η = 1 − (1 − ε 1 ) n−c 0 ≈ nε 1 .
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All the above mentioned work followed the so-called 'simple decoder' approach, i.e. an accusation value is computed for each user independently, and if it exceeds a certain threshold, the user is considered suspicious. In contrast, one can also use a 'joint decoder' which considers sets of users. Amiri and Tardos [2] have given a capacity-achieving joint decoder construction for the binary code. (Capacity refers to the informationtheoretic treatment [11, 16, 22] of the colluder attack as a communication channel.) However, the construction is rather impractical, requiring computations for many candidate coalitions. Even if more practical joint decoders are found, the simple decoder will serve as a stepping stone in their operation. Thus, interest in the simple decoder remains high. In [20] the binary construction was generalized to alphabets of arbitrary size q, in the simple decoder approach. It was shown that, in the restricted digit model, the transition to a larger alphabet size has benefits beyond the mere fact that a q-ary symbol carries log 2 q bits of information.
Main topic of this paper: the Gaussian approximation
The so-called 'Gaussian approximation' or 'Gaussian assumption', introduced in [21] , has been a useful tool in the analysis of Tardos codes. The assumption is that the pdf of a user's accusation value has a normal distribution. When this is the case, the statistical analysis of the code's performance can be drastically simplified; the performance is almost completely determined by a single parameter, namely the average accusationμ of the coalition.
The Gaussian assumption is motivated by the Central Limit Theorem (CLT): A user accusation consists of a sum of per-segment contributions, which are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). When many of these get added together, the result is close to normaldistributed, i.e. the pdf is very close to a Gaussian in a certain region around the average, and deviates in the tails. The longer the code becomes (i.e. the larger the coalition size c 0 ), the wider this central region. In [20, 21] theoretical results were provided arguing that the central region is sufficiently wide to allow for application of the Gaussian approximation for realistic parameter choices. However, these arguments are not very precise in nature and have not been sufficiently corroborated.
In this paper we provide an in-depth analytical and numerical investigation of the Gaussian approximation. Our approach is based on the addition rule for characteristic functions, and a method to re-write the false accusation probability as a power series expansion with increasing powers of 1/m.
Related work
Kuribayashi et al. [14] numerically studied the error probabilities of the binary Tardos code in the case of the majority voting attack. They used a fixed code length m = 10 4 and a false accusation probability of around 10 −8 . They found that the Gaussian approximation is valid under these circumstances.
Furon et al. [7] did a simulation-based numerical analysis of error probabilities for the binary Tardos code in the case of small coalitions and coupled false positive and false negative, ε 2 = ε c 0 /4 1 . The used a rate-minimizing attack, yet combined it with the simple decoder. Their method was based on rare event analysis. They found that the Tardos code performs better than expected.
In our work we decouple ε 2 from ε 1 and take ε 2 ≈ 0.5. We stay within the simple decoder approach. Our method to compute probabilities is general, and can be applied to all alphabet sizes and parameter settings.
Our approach is based on the elementary 'multiplication is convolution' property of the characteristic function (Fourier transform) of probability distributions (see e.g. [15] ). Computation of a cumulative distribution function of summed independent variables using this property is sometimes called Beaulieu's method [3] . In the context of watermarking it has been applied to analyze e.g. the robustness of Distortion-Compensated Dither Modulation [1] .
Contributions and outline
This paper discusses the case of the simple decoder, in the restricted digit model.
-We introduce a new parametrization of the colluder strategy in the restricted digit model.
As usual in the literature, their strategy is allowed to be probabilistic. In a given content segment, they receive symbol α a number of times equal to σ α . Under the usual symmetry assumptions, the strategy can be completely fixed by setting parameters which we denote as Ψ b (x); this is the probability that the attackers choose a symbol y that occurs σ y = b times, given that the rest of the symbols occur x times. The quantity Ψ b (x) does not depend on an actual symbol index, and is invariant under permutation of x. This new parametrization allows us to obtain more compact expressions for e.g. the average accusation of the coalition (μ), and the probability distribution of the accusation of innocent users. Furthermore, for several strategies it allows us to do a certain amount of pre-computation, speeding up the numerical analysis of the false positive errors. -For nonbinary alphabets and realistic parameter choices, we show that the statistical parameterμ is minimized when the colluders employ a majority voting attack. In the Gaussian approximation, the code length scales as m ∝ c 2 0μ −2 ; hence, the colluders want to minimizeμ. -We determine the pdf ϕ of an innocent user's accusation at a single content segment.
We show that the tails of the pdf follow a power law which depends on the colluder strategy. Independent of the strategy, the right tail falls off faster than the left tail. This is an advantageous property, since positive accusation of innocent users is undesirable. -We show that, given realistic parameter settings, the third abolute moment of the pdf is always finite. This guarantees convergence to the normal distribution. -The 'interleaving' colluder strategy, which is known to be information-theoretically optimal [10, 12] for c 0 → ∞ and binary alphabet, turns out to have special properties: the pdf andμ do not depend on the coalition size; the left and right tail are maximally heavy. -We compute the Fourier transformφ (characteristic function) of ϕ. In the Fourier domain, the pdf of a sum of two variables is simply the product of their pdfs. Using this fact, we obtain an analytic result for the false accusation probability expressed in terms ofφ m , containing only a single integration. -The integration mentioned in the previous point turns out to be rather difficult to compute numerically. In order to deal with this problem, we use a series expansion ofφ m in powers of 1/m. This yields an expression for the false accusation probability consisting of the Gaussian result plus correction terms of decreasing magnitude. The larger m is, the fewer terms are required. In the limit m → ∞ the tail of a Gaussian is all that remains. -We introduce a fast algorithm for computing strategy-dependent coefficients in the case of majority voting. We present numerical results for the majority voting and interleaving attacks. It turns out that the 'shape' parameter κ (which appears in the bias function, see Sect. 2) plays a major role in the speed of convergence to the Gaussian limit. The larger κ, the faster the convergence and the better the defense against the interleaving attack.
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In Sect. 2 we briefly review the q-ary Tardos code and the Gaussian approximation, introduce some notation (including the new strategy parametrization), and give some lemmas that are needed for the computations in later sections. After these long preliminaries, we show in Sect. 3 that the majority voting attack minimizes the parameterμ. In Sect. 4 we develop our method of systematically computing corrections to the Gaussian limit. Numerical results are shown in Sects. 5 and 6.
Preliminaries

The q-ary Tardos code
The setting in this paper is the q-ary Tardos code in the restricted digit model. We briefly summarize the most important concepts and introduce the notation. The length of a codeword (number of symbols) is denoted as m. The number of users who receive a codeword is n. The alphabet is Q, with size q. Sometimes the alphabet will be referred to as {0, . . . , q − 1} for simplicity. The notation X ji ∈ Q stands for the i'th symbol in the codeword of user j. The whole matrix of embedded codewords is X .
Code generation: The code is generated by a two-step probabilistic algorithm. First, m vectors
Here 1 q stands for the vector (1, . . . , 1) of length q, δ(·) is the Dirac delta function ensuring that the components p α add up to 1, and B is the generalized Beta function (also known as the Dirichlet integral). κ is a positive constant. In the case of the binary alphabet it is optimal to set κ = 1/2. A complication then occurs: the range of the p α variables has to be restricted to (t, 1 − t), with 0 < t 1, in order to avoid excessive accusation scores (see the 'accusation' step below). In this paper we will not consider the case (q = 2, κ = 
In the second step of the code generation, all matrix elements X ji are drawn independently according to the following distribution,
Notice that the probabilities do not depend on the row index j, i.e. p (i) determines the probabilities for a whole column of X . The attack: The coalition of attackers is C, with size |C| = c. The part of X observed by the coalition is X C . In the restricted digit model, the attackers create a pirated version of the content such that segment i contains a symbol y i ∈ Q. (In contrast to other attack models, e.g. the combined digit model, where erasures and combinations of multiple symbols are allowed.) We define vectors σ (i) 
i.e. the number of occurrences of the symbol α that the attackers see in column i. Obviously α∈C σ
The attackers have a (probabilistic) strategy for choosing their output symbols. As usual in the literature on this subject, it is assumed that this strategy is fully column-symmetric, symbol-symmetric and attacker-symmetric. The assumption of column and symbol symmetry of the attack is motivated by the fact that these symmetries are present in the code generation and accusation algorithms, and that all columns and symbols are handled completely independently. The assumption of attacker-symmetry is motivated by (i) the row symmetry and independence of the rows in the code generation and accusation; (ii) the fact that any departure from attacker-symmetry will endanger one attacker more than the others.
The strategy is expressed as a set of probabilities θ y|σ that apply independently for each segment. Omitting the column index i, we have for each i
Due to the marking condition some of these probabilities are fixed. Let e α denote the vector (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with the '1' in position α. Then
where δ is the Kronecker delta. Accusation: The watermark detector sees the symbol y i embedded in segment i of the attacked content. Users are classified as suspicious ('accused') or not suspicious according to the following algorithm. For each user j, the so-called accusation sum S j is computed,
where the expression [X ji == y i ] evaluates to 1 if X ji = y i and to 0 otherwise, and the functions g 0 and g 1 are defined as
In words: Having the same symbol as the attacked content induces a positive contribution g 1 ( p y i ) to the accusation sum, which becomes worse when y i is unlikely to occur. Having a symbol different from y i induces a negative amount g 0 ( p y i ), which becomes more negative when y i is likely to occur. The total accusation of the coalition is defined as S := j∈C S j . The choice (8) of g 0 , g 1 is the unique combination of functions that satisfies
This choice has been shown to be optimal for the binary alphabet [6, 21] , i.e. it minimizes the code length. Its unique properties (9) also hold for q ≥ 3; that is the main motivation for using (8) .
A user is 'accused' if his accusation sum exceeds a threshold Z . A list L is made of accused users,
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Performance: The 'performance' of the scheme involves four important parameters: the number of attackers that has to be resisted (c 0 ), the maximum tolerable false negative probability ε 2 (prob. of not catching any of the attackers),
the maximum tolerable false positive probability ε 1
and the length m of the code. (Note that the total probability of false positives occurring is approximately nε 1 .) One way of measuring how well the scheme works is to look at how big m has to be as a function of c 0 , ε 1 and ε 2 . The smaller m, the better the scheme. It is important to note that in forensic watermarking of audio/video content, a small false positive probability is the primary requirement. The false negative is far less important, since the deterring effect of forensic watermarking is preserved even for large ε 2 , of the order of 1 2 . Hence m essentially becomes a function of c 0 and ε 1 . In [20] an asymptotic result was obtained for large c 0 ,
Hereμ is the expectation value of the collective accusation sum of the coalition, scaled in such a way that the dependence on m is removed:μ = E[S]/m. In the case of the binary scheme (with κ = 1/2),μ = 2/π ≈ 0.64. For larger alphabets theμ depends on the parameter κ in a complicated way; for optimal κ, theμ takes values from approximately 0.8 to 1.4 as q goes from 3 to 10.
The Gaussian approximation
We briefly review the analysis of error probabilities performed in [20] , which leads to the result (13) . Consider, for some innocent user j, the probability distribution function (pdf) ρ m of the quantity S j / √ m. (Note that the pdf itself depends on m.) From (9) it follows that ρ m has zero mean and unit variance. For brevity we now introduce the notationZ = Z / √ m. The probability of falsely accusing j is given by
This is depicted as the shaded area 'FP' in Fig. 1 . We require
Similarly, consider the probability distribution τ m of the quantity S/(c √ m), but normalized in such a way that the mean is zero and the variance is 1. The cumulative distribution function is
It was shown in [23] 
, whereσ is the (scaled) standard deviation of the collective accusation, 2 . The requirement on the FN probability in case of c 0 attackers is then formulated as
The two equations (15) and (17) for given c 0 , ε 1 , ε 2 can be thought of as constraints in the (Z , m)-plane. It was shown that these constraints can be satisfied only if
where R inv m and T inv m are the inverse functions of R m and T m respectively. Note that T inv m (ε 2 ) < 0 for ε 2 smaller 4 than approximately 1/2; decreasing ε 2 leads to a longer code. It was shown that the T inv m term is negligible with respect to the R inv m term if c 0 is large and/or ε 2 ≈ 1/2. Hence, (18) in practice reduces to
Equation 19 in itself is not immediately useful, because R m depends on m. In the limit of large m, however, ρ m simply becomes a Gaussian independent of m, and R m is the area under a Gaussian tail, which we denote as Ω(Z ) = 
To the best of our knowledge, the above reasoning is the simplest argument available that yields the asymptotic relation m ∝ c 2 0 . It was argued in [20, 21] that m is so large that ρ m is Gaussian even a sufficient number of standard deviations away from 0. ('Sufficient' here means that the area under the Gaussian part is at least 1 − 2ε 1 so that the area under the right tail is estimated accurately.) The argument was based on the moments of the innocent accusation. However, a full analysis of the tails of ρ has never been done. Such a full analysis is important for the following reason. As (19) shows, it is advantageous for the attackers not only to decreaseμ, but also to modify the shape of R m such that R inv m (ε 1 ) increases, i.e. such that the right-hand tail of the innocent's accusation probability becomes longer. How much influence their strategy has on the shape of R m will be studied in Sects. 5 and 6. If there is hardly any influence, then the value ofμ uniquely determines m min , and the optimal strategy is to minimizeμ; if there is a significant influence, then the attackers' aim is to maximize the quotient R inv m (ε 1 )/μ.
Probabilities and expectation values
For given p, the probability that the colluders receive symbol occurrences σ is the multinomial distribution. We use the following notation,
where
It is always implicitly understood that α σ α = c. The marginal distribution for a single component σ α is the binomial. We use the notation
Lemma 1
The overall probability that the colluders receive symbol occurrences σ is given by
Proof We have Pr[σ ] = E p P(σ |p), with P(σ |p) given by (20) . The expectation E p stands for
The lemma follows by applying the Dirichlet integration rule (2).
Lemma 2 The marginal probability distribution f ( p α ) for a single component of the vector
In the latter integral, we write for all β = α:
Combining all these ingredients, we find
The lemma follows after evaluation of the d q−1 s integral using (2).
Lemma 3
The overall marginal probability distribution for one component of σ is
given by (21) and Lemma 2 respectively. The integral is evaluated using (2).
Corollary 1
Let σ \α denote the vector σ without the component σ α . The probability distribution of σ \α conditioned on σ α is given by
Proof Follows directly from Lemmas 1 and 3 by taking Pr
and simplifying the Beta functions.
We introduce a new parametrization of the colluder strategy. For b ∈ {1, . . . , c} and
The vector σ has σ α = b, and the other q − 1 components are given by x. The probability for outputting α given such a σ does not depend on the actual value of α, but only on b and x.
(In fact, it is even insensitive to permutations of x.) This follows from the symbol-symmetry and attacker-symmetry of the attack strategy. In words: Ψ b (x) is the coalition's probability of outputting a symbol which for them occurs b times, with the other symbol frequencies being x. In the case of the binary alphabet, x has only one component equal to c − b. We will then use the notation Ψ b , with Ψ 0 = 0 and Ψ c = 1 due to the marking condition. Next we define
It is implicit that β∈Q\{α}
(In some of the literature the notation θ x := Pr[y = 1| #received 1s = x] is used for the binary case. The relation with our notation is:
For any pirate strategy we have
due to the marking assumption.
Lemma 4 The numbers K b satisfy
q c b=1 K b P 1 (b) = 1.
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Proof The factor q can be replaced by y∈Q . Using the definition (24) we get
Lemma 5 If the colluder strategy is the interleaving attack
Substitute this into (24) and use the fact that the probabilities add up to 1.
Integrals and Gamma function equalities
which has the Dirichlet form (2).
Lemma 7 For x
1, and a 1 , a 2 such that |a 1 | x and |a 2 | x, it holds that
Proof Follows directly from Stirling's approximation
Lemma 8 Let c
1 and
Proof Follows directly from writing out the Beta functions in terms of Gamma functions and then applying Lemma 7.
Definition 1
We define Ω(z) as the probability mass in the right tail of the normal distribution beyond point z, 
Here H is the Hermite function.
Corollary 2 For x
Proof The first equality follows by applying Lemma 10 twice (once for the positive part of the integral, once for the negative). The second equality follows from the properties of the Hermite function (see e.g. p. 1094 of [8] ).
Remark In the case α = ν, the first term of the last line vanishes, yielding −2
). For integer ν, the Hermite function H ν−1 reduces to a Hermite polynomial. 5 
Fourier transforms
Definition 2 Let χ : R → C be a function. The Fourier transform of χ is denoted asχ and defined asχ
Lemma 11 If χ is a real-valued function, thenχ(
−k) = [χ(k)] * . Proof dx e −ikx χ(x) * = dx e −ikx χ(x) * = dx e ikx χ(x) =χ(−k).
Corollary 3 If χ is a real-valued function, then the even part ofχ(k) is Reχ(k), and the odd part is i · Imχ(k).
Proof By Lemma 11, the even part is
Lemma 12 Let χ(x) be a probability distribution function, and X a random variable with X ∼ χ. Then
Setting k = 0 gives the result. 
Corollary 4 Let ϕ be the probability distribution function of the one-symbol accusation S
Binary alphabet
The case q = 2 is simple. It was shown in [20] that for κ > 1/2 minority voting is optimal (in the sense of minimizingμ), while for κ < 1/2 it is majority voting. For κ = 1/2 the strategy has no effect onμ, whose value is then 2/π.
Remark At this point we are discussing only the effect onμ, not other criteria to judge the strength of attacks.
Non-binary alphabet
In [20] the following expression was obtained forμ (for the case q ≥ 3),
The colluders want to minimizeμ, while the content owner wants to maximize it.
Theorem 1 For q ≥ 3 and κ ≈ 1/q, the majority voting strategy minimizesμ.
Proof The 'optimal' colluder strategy (in the sense of makingμ as small as possible) is, for given σ , to choose y such that the expression W (σ y )
is minimized. It was found numerically in [20] that the optimal choice of the parameter κ against this attack is slightly larger than 1/q. Putting κ ≈ 1/q in (28), we see that the optimal attack strategy 
Theorem 2 The quantityμ as defined in (28) can be written as
Proof In (28) we shift the y to the front and write P(σ ) Proof In (29) we split off the b = c term, which has K c = 1 due to the marking condition. After some rewriting of Gamma functions this yields
In the limit of large c, the first term scales as Corollary 5 tells us that in the relevant case κ ≈ 1/q, the contributions toμ work completely different than in the usual binary scheme (q = 2, κ =
Statistics of the accusations
Our approach: Fourier transform
We now describe the basis of our method of computing false accusation probabilities. The whole approach is based on a single observation: when random variables are added, the pdf of the sum is obtained by multiplying the Fourier transforms of their respective pdf's and then doing a Fourier back-transform. In other words, if X ∼ f 1 , Y ∼ f 2 and Z = X + Y ∼ f 3 , thenf 3 =f 1f2 . When this rule is applied to the m random variables in the accusation sum, it leads to the following result.
Theorem 3 Let j be an innocent user. Let ϕ denote the pdf of S (i) j , with S (i)
j as defined in (7) . Letφ be the Fourier transform of ϕ. Then the probability that S j > Z is given by
Proof see Appendix A.
This result gives us a closed-form expression for R m (Z ) that contains only a single integration and a limited number of sums. (The sums are contained in the evaluation ofφ, as will become apparent in Sect. 4.3.) These will have to be evaluated numerically. Note that Pr[S j > 0] is not necessarily equal to 1 
.
It turns out that numerical evaluation of the integral in (31) is difficult, because of the fast oscillations of the integrand at large k. For this reason, we have chosen for a somewhat indirect method of evaluating (31). It is based on a series expansion in powers of k. It has the advantage that the accuracy of the numerical evaluation is well under control, and that the dependence of R m on m is visible. The disadvantage is that many terms in the expansion have to be kept. 
Theorem 4 Let j be an innocent user. Let ϕ have a finite third moment. Then it is possible to write
Proof see Appendix B.
The proof closely follows one of the standard proofs of the Central Limit Theorem. In the limit m → ∞ all the coefficients ω t vanish, leaving only the term Ω(Z ) which is the right-hand tail mass of the normal distribution. 2 ) (see Corollary 2). In Sect. 4.2 we determine the distribution ϕ. In Sect. 4.3 the Fourier transformφ is computed and the leading order parameters ν t , ω t , α t are derived.
Distribution function of an innocent user's accusation
Theorem 5 For an innocent user j, the distribution function ϕ of S (i)
j is given by
The proof is given in Appendix D. Note that all dependence on the strategy is contained in the numbers K b ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore we see that the left tail and the right tail of ϕ(u) have different power law behaviour. This is summarized in Table 1 . Note also that for 2κ[q − 1] > 1 the absolute third moment exists: the integral du |u| 3 ϕ(u) is convergent in both tails. (As opposed to the binary case with κ = 1/2.) Consequently, there is a guaranteed convergence to the normal distribution when i.i.d. random variables u i ∼ ϕ are added together in large numbers.
The right tail is dominated by the b = 1 term; it is proportional to (1/u) 5+2κ . The left tail is dominated by the b = c term, and is proportional to (1/|u|) 3+2κq−2κ . It was found numerically in [20] that the 'optimal' κ (in terms of maximizingμ) lies close to 1/q; for such a choice of κ the left tail is heavier than the right tail.
Such a property is obviously beneficial for not accusing innocent users. The discrepancy between the tails is even more pronounced if the attackers use the majority voting strategy (which for q ≥ 3, κ ≈ 1/q minimizesμ, as mentioned in Sect. 3). Then the right tail is dominated by the b = c/q term, which behaves as (1/u) 3+2 c/q +2κ , which for c > q decreases even faster than (1/u) 5+2κ . From this perspective it may be better for the attackers not to use majority voting; another strategy may yield a form of the ρ curve that is better for them. The best strategy strikes a balance between decreasingμ and lengthening the tail of ϕ + (u).
In the binary case, it is easy to identify where the balance lies: For κ ≈ 1 2 , the strategy has practically no effect onμ, so the attackers should concentrate on lengthening the ϕ + (u) tail. This is achieved by setting Ψ b nonzero for small values of b, e.g. interleaving or minority voting.
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The behaviour of ϕ(u) around u = 0 is also noteworthy. For u ↑ 0 the function is dominated by the b = 1 contribution |u| 1+2κ , which has zero derivative at u = 0. For u ↓ 0 the b = c term u −1+2κ[q−1] dominates; this one, however, has infinite derivative for κ < 1/(q − 1) (which is the case when e.g. κ ≈ 1/q).
Corollary 6
For an innocent user, the overall probability of positive and negative accusation are in general unequal, and are given by . This is consistent with the fact that the left (u < 0) tail is heavier: the probability mass at u < 0 must be further removed from u = 0 in order to cause E[u] = 0.
Corollary 7 If the colluder strategy is the interleaving attack, θ y|σ
and
Proof The first part follows directly by applying Lemma 5 to (34) and using It is interesting to note that the interleaving attack yields a ϕ(u) distribution that has the heaviest possible tails for both positive and negative u (see Table 1 ): proportional to (1/|u|) 3+2κ[q−1] for the left tail and (1/u) 5+2κ for the right tail. It also has the lowest possible dominant powers around u = 0. Furthermore, ϕ(u) has the special property that it is completely independent of c.
The Fourier transform of ϕ
We compute the Fourier transform (characteristic function) of ϕ(u) using the following lemma. 
This integral is expressed in terms of hypergeometric 1 F 2 functions as
Notice that in general Λ(d, v; k)
is not an entire function of k due to the appearance of the factor k 2v in the first term, which for general v is not an entire function. The hypergeometric function 1 F 2 has the sum representation 1
The radius of convergence is infinity. The 1 F 2 function can be evaluated by using software packages such as Mathematica.
Theorem 6 The Fourier transform of ϕ is given bỹ
with Λ as defined in Lemma 13 , and 
Proof Follows by substituting the first expression for Λ from Lemma 13 into Theorem 6, and then cutting off the small-argument power series of the 1 F 2 function (which is preceded by a factor (−ik) 2v ) after the k 0 term.
Corollary 9 If the colluders use the interleaving attack, theñ
Proof The Fourier integrals of the ϕ + and ϕ − given in Corollary 7 are precisely of the form handled in Lemma 13,
respectively.
Numerics for the majority voting strategy
We first present a fast algorithm for computing the K b parameters in the case of majority voting. Then we show numerical results for the minimum code length required to resist a coalition of c 0 attackers who use the majority voting strategy. 
The proof is given in Appendix C. These expressions look very complicated. However, they are easier to evaluate numerically than (24). Evaluation of (40) Note that a large number N can be chosen that satisfies N > max{c − b, bq − c} for all c/q ≤ b < c/2. Then all the N b values in (40) can be set to N . The price one pays for this small simplification is that the sums contain more terms.
Behaviour of R m (Z) for majority voting
From all the results in the previous sections, the false accusation probability for a fixed innocent user, as a function of q, κ, c, and m, is numerically computed as follows (assuming ε 2 ≈ 1/2). The K b parameters are evaluated using Lemma 14. A power series expansion for x =φ(k) − 1 is obtained from Theorem 6. It is substituted in the series expansion of ln(1 + x). Then k is replaced by k/ √ m and the whole expression is multiplied by m, yielding a power series for m lnφ(k/ √ m). The first term, − 1 2 k 2 , is split off, and the rest is substituted into the power series of the exp function. The resulting series precisely yields the powers ν t , 'angles' α t and coefficients ω t (m) as defined in (32). These are then used in (33) to obtain the final result.
We did the handling of the power series and further numerical evaluations with Wolfram's Mathematica 7 package, using standard precision settings. The Hermite functions were evaluated using the ParabolicCylinderD function, which is part of the Mathematica function library. Figure 3 shows a typical example of the shape of the resulting curve. For low values ofZ the curve lies below the Gaussian tail integral Ω(Z ), meaning that the Gaussian approximation is actually pessimistic there! Then at some point the curve crosses Ω(Z ) and becomes a power-law tail. The existence of a transition was expected: for finite m the CLT predicts that convergence to the Gaussian shape occurs only in a central region around 0; outside of this region (larger Z ) the original power-law behaviour of ϕ(u) prevails (see the analysis in [20] ). We also find that m cross increases with q. This can be understood from the same reasoning as above. The main contribution to the right tail, (1/u) 3+2κ+2c/q , is an increasing function of q.
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It is important to remark on the number of terms that should be kept in the power series. If too few terms are kept, the R m (Z ) values fluctuate wildly. Some general, unsurprising rules of thumb apply. For an accurate result, more terms need to be kept whenZ is increased and when m is decreased. For m < 100, powers larger than k 50 are required, with rather long computation times. Less obviously, the crossover region sometimes needs more terms than other values ofZ . For example, the curve in Fig. 3 requires powers up to k 20 to get a converging result aroundZ = 8. An example of such convergence is shown in Fig. 4 . With the interleaving attack (Sect. 6) ν max > 60 is sometimes required in the transition region. Table 2 shows sufficient code lengths against colluders who use the majority voting strategy. The crossover values m cross are also listed. We take parameters: ε 2 ≈ 1 2 , κ ≈ 1/q, with κ > 1/q. The sufficient code length m * as a function of q, κ, c, ε 1 was determined as follows. We numerically solved the equation The normal distribution has Ω(Z ) = 10 −10 atZ = 6.36
Sufficient code lengths for majority voting
for m, whereμ maj is the statistical parameterμ computed according to (29) for the majority voting strategy. 6 Table 2 gives the solution m * as well as theZ value at the solution (Z * ), and the crossover 7 value m cross as defined in Sect. 5. Remark This is not the final word on the majority voting attack. Better results can probably be achieved with different choices of κ. This is left for future work.
6 Numerics for the interleaving strategy
Behaviour of R m (Z) for the interleaving attack
False positive probabilities were computed as described in Sect. 5.2, except for two differences: (i) The starting point for the power series in k is Corollary 9, so there is no need to compute the K b parameters.
(ii) The shape of R m now does not depend on c. An example is shown in Fig. 5 . We have observed for q ≥ 3 that a crossing point of the R m and Ω curve as in Fig. 3 can occur for small κ (e.g. q = 3, κ = 0.34, m = 10 4 ). However, we mostly studied somewhat larger κ than in Sect. 5, in order to obtain shorter codes, and for these there were no crossings.
As a general rule we have observed that increasing q worsens the convergence to the Gaussian limit. We conjecture that this is caused by the faster dwindling left tail, (1/|u|) 3+2κ[q−1] , while the right tail remains equally heavy.
Sufficient code length for the interleaving attack
Theorem 7 For the interleaving strategy, theμ parameter becomes
Proof From the definition ofμ it follows that it can be computed as an expectation value in a single content segment,
, with E the expectation over p, σ and y, and g 1 and g 0 as defined in (8) . The E y (. . .) expectation is given by y σ y c (. . .). We write
From the properties of the multinomial distribution we get
Next, the expectation E p over the full vector p reduces to the 
The result of the integration does not depend on y, so the y yields a factor q. The integral yields B κ + Figure 6 shows the effect ofμ inter on the code length for various q and κ. For the interleaving attack, the factor 2/μ 2 , which appears as a multiplier in the Gaussian limit expression (13) for the code length, is a decreasing function of κ and q. Increasing the alphabet has a large impact when q is small, but very little impact when q is large. In the case of the interleaving attack, Eq. 43 for finding the sufficient code length m * has more structure than in the case of majority voting. To be completely explicit about the dependence on the various variables we writeμ inter (q, κ) and R qκm (Z ). Sinceμ inter and R qκm do not depend on c, it makes sense to isolate c and reorganize (43) as
This equation gives an upper bound on the coalition size that can be resisted by the code. The easiest way to handle the numerics is to choose (for fixed q, κ, ε 1 ) a set of values for m, and then computeZ * and c as a function of m. (The results for c are not integer in general, but it is implicitly understood that they should be rounded down.) We therefore present our results in a slightly different form than in Sect. 5.3. Figure 7 shows howZ * and m * converge to their Gaussian limits as a function of the code length. The c on the horizontal axis is a parametrization of m, representing the coalition size that can be resisted by the code. The limiting value forZ * is Ω inv (ε 1 ). The limiting value for m * is m limit = [cΩ inv (ε 1 )/μ] 2 . We have plotted the fraction m
Note that the factor [Ω inv (ε 1 )] 2 in the expression for m limit is noticeably smaller than the bound 2 ln(1/ε 1 ). This means that the code can be made even shorter. The ratio Fig. 8 . Figure 9 shows the familiar code length proportionality constant m/(c 2 ln ε −1 1 ). The case of the binary alphabet (q = 2) is rather special. If κ is set to 1 2 , then the left tail of ϕ(u) becomes so heavy that E(|u| 3 ) = ∞, severely hampering convergence to the Gaussian limit. Tardos [23] introduced a cutoff parameter t 1 so that p α ∈ (t, 1 − t), which curbs the tail, yielding E(|u| 3 ) < ∞. (Tardos did not formulate it in this way; for him it was a technical trick that allows for the use of the Markov inequality in a crucial part of a security proof.) We do not set κ exactly to 1 2 and we do not use the cutoff t, but instead we consider κ ≥ 0.55. This is close enough to get a good impression of the behaviour of the original Tardos code, but large enough to get numerical results quickly. For κ closer to 1 2 our method requires many more powers of k to be kept, leading to long computation times. We observe a difference between q = 2 and q ≥ 3. In the binary case, the results are better , as a function of c, for various q and κ than Gaussian in a large portion of parameter space, and already at small coalition sizes. For q ≥ 3, the Gaussian limit is approached 'from the other side', i.e. with results that are worse than the Gaussian limit.
From the numerics we conclude that the attack vs. defense game is quite complex. In the asymptotic limit, theμ-minimizing strategy of [20] is the best attack; the best defense was shown to be setting κ a bit larger than 1/q; in that regime the attack is basically majority voting. In the small c regime the interleaving attack is a potent strategy. It can be effectively defended against by choosing κ as large as possible; this facilitates convergence to the Gaussian limit and at the same time increasesμ. However, κ cannot be increased indefinitely, for otherwise the defense against other attacks becomes too weak. (Theμ-minimizing attack of [20] becomes too powerful.) Finding a balance between these effects is left for future work.
Summary and future work
We have analyzed the q-ary Tardos fingerprinting scheme in the restricted digit model. We have introduced a new parametrization Ψ b (x) of the attack strategy. It has the advantage that it no longer depends on any symbol index α; furthermore, it allows for pre-computation of the parameters
We have shown for κq ≈ 1 that the majority voting strategy minimizesμ. We have determined the probability distribution of the accusation of an innocent user due to a single content segment. Using the Fourier approach we have used this to set up a series expansion for the systematic computation of the total accusation probability for an innocent user. As a first test of our method we have numerically evaluated our expansions for ε 1 = 10 −10 and various parameter settings. We have done this for two attacks that are of special interest, the majority voting attack and the interleaving attack. We have found that the 'shape' parameter κ plays a crucial role. When κ is chosen so as to maximizeμ in the face of aμ-reducing attack, then convergence to the Gaussian limit is quite bad, especially for large alphabets. Increasing κ dramatically improves the convergence. At the same time theμ decreases; hence, the game of attack and defense is quite complex, involving the ratio of R inv m (ε 1 ) andμ instead of a single one of these parameters. A full study of general attacks, for different ε 1 , is left for future work.
It would be interesting to see if the approach developed here can be applied to information-theoretic accusation methods.
Substituting (49) into (48) and rearranging the order of the integrations, we get
In the last line of (50) we changed the integration variable to k = −λ √ m in order to get the 'scaled' threshold Z / √ m in the integrand, which makes it easier to visualize the result using Fig. 1 . We define
for brevity and write
The power expansion of D odd around k = 0 has dominant term k a , where a > 0 (Corollary 4). We write
Here we made use of a standard representation of the delta function,
We also used the fact that in the remaining integration the D even vanishes since it gets multiplied by an odd function of k. Then we use that a > 0 in the power series of D odd . This causes the integrand to behave like k −1+a in the limit η → 0, i.e. the integral near k = 0 is convergent even when η is precisely zero. Thus we can set η = 0 in this integral.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 4
We start from Corollary 4 and write a general power series expansion,
where the r t ≥ 3 are powers and the γ t ∈ C are coefficients of the form i β t sgn k times a real factor. In this expression the desired relationφ(−k) = [φ(k)] * evidently holds, and the propertiesφ(0) = 1,φ (0) = 0,φ (0) = −1, |φ (0)| < ∞ are clearly present. Then we write
where the powers r t ≥ 3 and coefficients δ t ∝ i β t sgn k are obtained (laboriously) by substituting (53) into the Taylor series for the logarithm, ln(1 + ε) = ε − ε 2 /2 + ε 3 /3 − ε 4 /4 + . . ..
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It is worth noting that m disappears from the k 2 term, but not from the others. Equation 32 is obtained from (54) by using the Taylor series for the exp function,
and (again laboriously) collecting terms with equal powers of k.
Since we started out with powers r t ≥ 3, we end up with powers ν t ≥ 3. A power |k| ν t may occur together with many different powers of m. This is seen as follows. The series expansion of lnφ(k/ √ m) is a power series in |k|/ √ m. Then the logarithm is multiplied by m, and a power |k| r always occurs together with m 1−r /2 . Next, the k-expansion of exp mixes up the powers of m. For instance, the power k 6 occurs as mδ 6 (|k|/ √ m) 6 ∝ k 6 m −2 but also as a term [mδ 3 (|k|/ √ m) 3 ] 2 /2! ∝ k 6 m −1 . The 'worst case' (many factors m resulting from high powers of ε in (55)) occurs when ν t is a multiple of 3, say ν t = 3 j; there the power k 3 j can be built up from a term [mδ 3 (|k|/ √ m) 3 ] j /j!, which is proportional to k 3 j m j−3 j/2 = k ν t m −ν t /6 . All the j factors scale as m(|k|/ √ m) 3 = |k| 3 / √ m. This is the least negative power of m that can occur relative to the power of k. For other powers ν t , the 'building blocks' from which k ν t is built up cannot all scale in this way; at least one of the factors has faster decay. 8 This proves the statement about the at least m −ν t /6 decay.
Finally, (33) follows by applying Lemma 9 and Corollary 2 to evaluate the integrals that arise when (32) is substituted into Theorem 3. 
In the last line we used the fact that the a is arbitrary. Finally, without loss of generality we can set a = 1.
The case c/q < b < c/2
We have Ψ b (x) = 0 whenever x j > b for some index j. Hence we only have to sum over Notice that we let get as large as q − 1, even though it may be impossible to satisfy the x-sum constraint for large ; this is taken care of by the Kronecker delta, which sets the constraint-violating terms to zero. Next we use a sum representation of the Kronecker δ as follows,
with z = ( + 1)b + x 1 + · · · + x q−1− − c and t b = e i2π/N b . This is a correct representation only if N b is larger than the maximum |z| that can occur. Hence, in order for (58) to work for the δ in (57), N b must be larger than the maximum value of |( + 1)b + x 1 +· · ·+ x q−1− − c| that may occur for any . Taking into account that the range of b is c/q ≤ b < c/2, and that x j ≤ b − 1, the bound on N b as stated in the Lemma follows after some algebra. We shift the a-sum completely to the left, through the x-sum and the -sum. Next we write the upper Beta function in (24), for given multiplicity , as 
Next we evaluate the -sum analytically. It is given by
with
Finally the result (42) follows after some elementary rewriting.
In the last line we have used that K 0 = 0 and that the integral over p y yields the same result for every y. In order to evaluate the p y -integral we have to rewrite the delta functions of (64) into the form δ( p y − · · · ). We use the rule
for any monotonic function w( p), which yields
After some algebra, it is then seen that the p y -integral evaluates to
Splitting ϕ into a part containing Θ(u) and a part containing Θ(−u) finally yields the end result.
